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I, INTRODUCTION
Approaching the Problem: The Military in Developing Countries,
Armaments and the underdeveloped world are two preeminent contemporary concerns, and cir=
cumstances have drawn attention to the ways in which they interact, Compelling as the nuclear as
pect of the armament problem may be, the interest shown by many of the emerging nations in global
disarmament negotiations has led to a certain amount of self-searching about the military facts of
life. Even as they have urged the great powers to put aside their arms, these countries have found
themselves facing urgent security needs at home.
At the same time,, whether armed forces are inherited from a colonial past,. indigenously
generated, or the result of co-option into the Cold War, they are among the attributes of nation-
statehood eagerly sought by young nations. Once established, the military have frequently inter-
vened in the political affairs of their countries. To Americans, this has represented a vexing
policy problem and a disturbing departure from the liberal democratic tradition we would like to
see embraced by these young nations.
In the resulting search for patterns and doctrine, a distressing, if understandable, gap
exists in the literature, for little attention has been given to the current state of the military
art in these smaller powers, per seo Their military problems and technology are usually dealt with
peripherally, either in the discussions of the political role of the military, or in strategic con
siderations of Cold War Problems in the so-called "grey areas". In the latter case, the problem is
generally viewed in terms of the proximity of these countries to the Communist bloc, and it is only
colncidental that they are also underdeveloped'2 More recently, the geographic focus has broadened
already sizable forces. Even under favorable conditions, in a modern industrial state with high-
grade skills and a carefully determined policy, it can take years to effect significant changes in
force structure. Although the political and economic constraints that affect large scale mobiliza-
tions or demobilizations of manpower may not be the same as in countries with advanced economies,
some undoubtedly exist in the underdeveloped countries., The ability of local forces to cope with
modern weapons technology and the relationship of that technology to indigenous problems needs to
be better understood, as do the means for acquiring such technology.
This is not as simple as knowing whether a five-foot tall Vietnamese can cope with a
rifle designed for a six-foot American, or whether an African with a relatively limited education
can learn to fly and service a jet fighter--although these are clearly relevant. It also entails
the discovery of uses for weapon systems that may never have been considered in their design. Ex-
amples are the counter-insurgency uses of napalm, or the use of air traffic control equipment for
tactical air control in fighting guerrillas. No small amount of experience has been gained in such
problems through the Military Assistance Program (MAP), as well as the efforts of departing colo-
nial powers to provide new nations with security forces. Little of this experience, however, has
been set forth and analyzed in the open literature.
Events have served to direct special attention to the roles played by the military in the
emerging countries and this thus becomes the third necessary input. In spite of the start that has
been made in looking at this problem much of it remains at the broadly theoretical stage, There are
no acceptable criteria by which to judge the long-term effects of a military coup on the process of
naCion-building. Such evidence as has accumulated suggests that the concentration of power and or-
or appear in repeating patterns. Their bearing upon the type and size of individual military estab-
lishments must be considered,
The most basic and uniting of these factors is the common task of political and economic
development, This may influence the military requirements in a variety of sometimes competing ways.
The expense of maintaining a military establishment is a prime reason for holding its size to a mini-
mum. While even the American Secretary of Defense is seeking the best ways of reducing an enormous
defense budget, Africans and Latin Americans have pertinently asked themselves "against whom do we
arm--ourselves?" 6  (The antagonist's role is unfortunately more easily filled in the case of the
Middle East or the Asian perimeter.) The competition for scarce resources is an acute problem in
these countries, although they have often found it possible to shift the main burden of supporting
their armed forces onto external aid programs, thereby lessening domestic pressures to hold down the
levels,
The political elite may regard the military with suspicion as potential competitors for po-
litical power, but they often cope with this by integrating the army into their system of control, as
Nkrumah has done in Ghana. When the army becomes a part of a mass party system7 incentives are in-
creased for further recruitment, rather than its diminishment. Costa Rica, on the other hand, success-
fully abolished its army in 1948 and has succeeded in avoiding the troublesome Latin American problem
of military domination since that time.
Pacificist ideological concerns have occasionally shaped policy to minimize the size of the
armed forces. India has found, however, that such ideals sometimes have less than practical effect in
the real world. It remains too early to tell whether professions of pacific intent will have any real
insurgency problem as a more realistic contribution to hemispheric defense than the old World War II
style armies. These changes must, however, be accomplished in the face of different and well-en-
trenched traditions of military practice. At the same time, the geographical proximity of the vast
power of the United States, while causing important political repercussions, represents a factor
that is relatively unusable in dealing with regional security problems. Although the Organization
of American States is one of the oldest regional organizations and has a history of peace-keeping
concerns, its influence upon military policies and levels of armament has hitherto been negligible.
In the much newer nations of Africa, nationalism, potential intra-African conflicts, and
other factors are causing increases in the level of the armed forces from initially very low levels.
The ability to rely upon metropolitan powers for security assistance may help keep this in hand,
but African pride seems to be seeking ways out of this dependence. Failure to find a collective for-
mula, such as in the Organization for African Unity, could well lead to even larger individual mili-
tary efforts.
The complexity of Middle East politics needs no reiteration to emphasize the severity of
the arms problem in this area. Conflicts within the area, both intra-Arab and Arab-Israeli, tend
to be expressed as arms races, drawing assistance from any country willing to grant it. Turkey and
Iran receive Western support for their military establishments through their involvement in the Cold
War. Economic limitations are often the only factors tending to moderate the arms problem in this
region.
The perimeter of Asia is most prominently influenced in its security needs by the dominat-
ing figure of China and the Cold War. It is also one of the few areas of the underdeveloped world
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The security difficulty is compounded in the case of underdeveloped countries by the noto=
rious unreliability of any data which are available. Statistical competence is thinly spread even
where records have been kept. Local sensitivities are frequently served by the invention, inflation,
or deflation of figures; and statistics about armed forces and defense efforts are particularly sen-
sitive to the service of political needs. These may be the desire to put pressure upon a neighbor,
or, conversely, to assume a pacific posture in international politics.
There should thus be few illusions about the accuracy of the available data in detail,
but it should adquately provide some feel for the range and dynamics of the problem, Accuracy,
reasonability, and consistency have been the general criteria of choice for this paper, but speci-
fic reasons for the selection of data and the occasional use of alternative data may be made clear in
each case, /See the appendices -- especially the introduction to Appendix II -- for further discussion
of technical difficulties associated with the data,/ A few inconsistencies or errors may have crept
into the tables, too. Hopefully, it will prove possible in the future to improve on the data and
methodology used here, and the author would appreciate having any errors brought to his attention.
Finally, it is well to recall the great variety represented by these eighty-odd nations.
The diversity of backgrounds, problems, and conditions means that they cannot be forced into a single
mold,, Although at such policy levels as AID and the Defense Department these diversities have led to
increased use of the country approach. 11 a search for doctrine requires the more general approach as
well. The body of this paper emphasizes more general considerations while the appendices contain de-
tailed data on each country and region,
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efforts are more usefully compared with those of their neighbors, either as potential antagonists,
or as countries facing similar internal security problems, To make such comparisons manageable
quantitative data are absolutely essential.
Security and Mobilized Manpower.
In this study the comparative index of mobilized manpower is expressed in terms of the
percentage of the population under arms. Some studies have attempted to refine similar data to
the extent of expressing force levels as ratios of certain productive age groups2 or of the
military-aged male population.3 These efforts have their utility especially when dealing with
more developed countries or in seeking to express the economic benefits foregone by using pro-
ductive manpower for military purposes.4 In the latter case, however, this refinement implies
certain assumptions concerning economic productivity which are not necessarily sustainable.
Certainly, devoting skills to the building of armed forces means that these skills will not be a-
vailable for other developmental tasks, unless, that is, civic action work is made an important
military function. But the interaction between the armed forces and the manpower market in less-
developed countries is somewhat more complex than this. An army position is often regarded as a
relatively secure and well-paying job in a primitive economy. On the other hand, rapid economic
development can make it difficult to recruit even minimal force levels without some form of con-
scription. Presently, young economies are often unable to absorb those whose skills are not spe-
cifically related to their needs, and this can put pressures upon the military to absorb these
men to prevent idleness leading to agitation, These varying problems make it difficult to compare
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days of the Cold War with American aid, Only recently have they seriously been turned toward in-
ternal security as a major factor in shaping their characteristics, At the same time a whole new
dimension has been added to the internal security problem by the need to deal with new kinds of
insurgency movements. Counter-insurgency needs encompass a wide range of responses, depending
upon the characteristics and stage of development of the insurgent movement. /See below,/
The other area where armed forces are most likely to be focused on internal security
problems is Sub-Saharan Africa. The new African states have not approached stable force levels
yet, and indications are of continued and rapid expension. /Tee Part III, Resources for Military
Efforts, for a discussion of these indications./
The utility of statistics is affected by which categories are included in them, If in-
ternal security is to be examined in detail, the armed forces are not the only group which should
be included in the index; one would want to also look at the ratio of the total personnel engaged
in maintaining law and order, It would also be desirable to set certain standards of domestic
peace as a yardstick against which to measure the effectiveness of these forces; the accepted level
of violence in the remoter areas of Colombia would not be viewed as domestic peace and tranquility
by many people, yet Colombia is relatively underarmed by general Latin American standards.
It is also possible to view the percentage of the population under arms as an index of
perception of external threats. Thus it is not surprising that national rivalries in the Middle
East have resulted in high force levels by this index, or that very high levels occur in the case
of some Asian states, Using this as an index of threat-perception, however, is not without its
difficulties. The United States is by this index a relatively threatened nation, and spends about
teresting finding; for such percentage orientations are seldom explicit in the thinking of defense
planners. Moreover, most models of international relations assume that the activities of other
states are the main stimulus in determining a nation's security effort. Our data indicates, how-
ever, that outside of brief transitional periods during which a country may change its level of
effo,:t, these models do not seem to apply to relations among the developing countries. Consider-
ing the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union in this respect may indicate that this
is equally true of all countries; for the relationship between their defense efforts, widely
assumed to be very closely tied, shows similar stability and independence.
The reasons for these apparent stabilities in levels of defense efforts are not at all
clear. They may involve recruiting or training techniques that place constraints upon the percen-
tage of the general population which the armed forces can absorb. They may reflect stable nation-
al policies toward public expenditure and investment, either through stable political control (as
in a one-party system) or stable national--or bureaucratic--consensus through successive changes
of government. In many cases it is hard to tell without more detailed analysis whether a country's
behavior represents a choice based upon preference, or one imposed by constraints over which it
has no control. The limitations, for example, on the diversion of resources from economic develop-
ment or from an economy of scarcity to defense, or the trade-off between investments in defense
and in development, are little understood at present.
The stability may even be derived from unconscious processes quite unrelated to security
considerations, or to fixation upon a figure regarded as an acceptable burden at one time and not
varied over years of changing circumstances. The fixation of some Central American powers on certain
-17-
Force Requirements.
It is impossible to give an accurate assessment of the actual requirements of the
emerging nations for military forces at this time. The variety of individual problems is too
great to generalize without being more certain of the categories into which it can be broken
for more systematic treatment. Such a schema for treating security threats to developing coun-
tries might eventually appear along these lines:*
1. Direct great power threats (e.g., China to India and Taiwan).
2. Threats by local coalitions or great power proxies (e.g., to Israel, South Korea).
3. Threat of local aggression or border conflict with a single local power (e.g.,
Indonesia to Malaysia, between Somalia and Ethiopia). /This category would sure-
ly spread out of two dimensions: the size of the powers involved, and the degree
of external aid./
4. Externally aided insurgencies--especially "Wars of National Liberation," i.e.,
Communist-aided (e.g., in South Vietnam, Venezuela, and some aspects of the Congo
/Lpvl/).
5. Indigenous insurgencies (e.g., in Colombia, Iraq). LThese often include some
element of Type 4./
6. Sporadic outbreaks of violence and rioting (e.g., as in Uganda, Tanganyika, Panama).
/This is often an early stage of an insurgency problem./
7. Ordinary police functions.
*A more rigorous treatment of this typology used to classify the data available in
Appendix II might provide some firmer indicators on security requirements. The methodological
problem is a formidable one, however.
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picture is important to keep in mind in the consideration of any attempts to control the armament
problem in underdeveloped areas by formal means, for such efforts would have great impact on cur-
rent policy programs attempting to deal with the insurgency problem. The "Special Group", estab-
lished to survey American policies relating to C1, regards the entire globe as being within the
area to be considered. A number of so-called "Internal Defense Plans"(IDPs) have been drawn up
for various countries with current or latent insurgency problems and more are under way. The
probability of continued nuclear stability between the United States and the Soviet Union means
that CI operations will represent a growing portion of United States and Western operations in
the Cold War. Whether Soviet- or Chinete-sp6nsored,-inisurgency is certain to become a major
disrupting problem in coming years. 10
It is generally recognized that the CI problem is not suscepitible to a purely military
solution, but even the military means required to deal with it remain unclear. Estimates of the
superiority required for coping with an advanced insurgency, such as that in Vietnam, range from
about 9 to 1 to 16 to 1.11 Great emphasis' iscnowtbeiigsput on dealing with the problem before it
gets well started, and police, intelligence, and communications systems receive special attention.
To summarize, the lack of consensus on the manpower needed for CI operations, the range
of statistical evidence available, and the wide range of security threats which exist, point up
the difficulties of establishing firm prescriptive manpower levels needed for security, both ex-
ternal and internal, in the underdeveloped areas. Lacking institutionalized facilities, such as
a UN Peace Force, to assist them in dealing with at least some of these security problems, each
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nations as they do in advanced countries, if not more Particularly in countries where the armed
forces comprise an active part of the political and governmental processes, as in Indonesia, Burma
Algeria and the like, 12 explanations for changes in policies and in the indices presented in this
paper may be found that are unrelated to the usual concepts of national security,
One curious example of such effects is suggested, although in need of confirmation, by
the case of Dahomey, where the armed forces decreased by 200 men (one-fifth) according to our data
between 1963 and 1964, contrary to the previous upward trend, This change followed a November,
1963, coup by the military in that country, and one may suggest that the decrease may have been
caused by the transfer of military men to civilian positions of authority. There are,of course,
two ways in which a military coup could have effect on the number of men in the armed forces:
the number will rise if the military choose to incorporate the civilian bureaucrates into their
organization, and go down if the military choose to become civilian bureaucrats themselves, Subt
ler effects seem more likely, however, such as increased recruitment authorization, or a higher
defense budget,
Political considerations such as this are equally demanding of attention in any com-
prehensive attempt to treat military problems in these countries.
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budget, about $9 million, to that country in aid. 2 Thus the budgetary data represents an indi-
cator of the burden of the defense effort on the Malagasy economy, but it does not reflect the
size of the military effort. In other cases a trade-off occurs where substantial economic aid
permits a country to divert more of its own resources to military effort than would otherwise be
possible.
In spite of the difficulties associated with budgetary data in the developing coun-
tries, some calculations involving defense budget figures produce very interesting results.
Appendices I and II in this study present statistics on Defense Expenditures as a percent of the
Gross National Product, and Appendix IIcondefense expenditure per capita of population, and per
member of the armed forces.
Level of Defense Expenditure
Annual defense expenditure as a percentage of the Gross National Product is probably the
best figure to use as an aggregate index for comparative purposes. This should be particularly
true in these countries where the total amount of economic resources available is relatively s'mall
and allocation problems very difficult and competitive. A case can be made for the percentage of
the national budget as an index of the government's attention to security matters, since the total
budget represents the resources available to the government, However, widely different practices
exist depending upon the role which the government plays in the economic life of the society, as
in the case of socialist or mixed economies, and so the percentage of the national budget ,is not
a useful comparative index.
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Forces as percent of Population and defense Budget as per cent of GNP. It is quite clear, for
example, that India is in an arms race with China==not Pakistan; for the real shift in the level
of India's military effort has come since the border hostilities with the Chinese. In terms of
absolute numbers, of course, the efforts of Israel and Egypt particularly represent significant
levels of armament, if not direct interaction on this basis. The quite high involvement of de-
fense activities in these areas also indicates that economic consequences of some magnitude would
attach to any attempts to control their armaments.
Defense Expenditure per Capita,
For some reason this is a very popular statistic in comparisons of defense efforts,4
In most cases, however. it is not particularly helpful unless it can be compared with some index
of the economic resources available (on the average) to the members of a society: i.e., the GNP
per capita, In terms of dollars and cents this has the advantage of painting very starkly the
slice which each person's share of the defense effort takes out of the very small GNP per capita
which characterize the underdeveloped economy, As a percentage, of course, the population can
cels out, giving our previous indicator: Defense Expenditure as Percent GNP,*
*The mathematics involved are as follows:
DefL BudN X 100 = D.B. Poo X 100 = X 100 = Defense Budget as % GNP
Population Pop, Pop. GNP GNP
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The results of this calculation appear to have exceeded expectations. Not only does
this index appear to provide a good indicator on the average of well-versus-poorly equipped
armed forces) but it indicates periods of re-equipment and intentions regarding expansion,
Details of equipment are very sketchy for the developing countries, but a good example
of a country which has engaged in expensive equipment programs is Venezuela, which has one of the
best air forces in Latin America. Probably as a consequence of this program, (for air equipment
is a very expensive commodity), Venezuela emerges at the top of the Latin American rank orders on
the basis of this variable, outdistancing Colombia, the next highest, by a factor of two.
An example of a re equipment phase is shown by the Australian case (included in Appendix
11 for comparative purposes rather than as an underdeveloped country), Australia's defense forces
are now going into a period of re-equipment including the projected purchase of American F=111
fighter'bombers (TFXs). The financing for this purchase includes some immediate payments. For
this and other reasons, the latest data on Australian defense budgets indicates a jump of about
$700 in the DX/AF figure.
The most interesting result of all, however, is shown by the remarkable difference be-
tween the regional averages for Latin America, North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, on the
one hand, and that for Sub-Saharan Africa. The latter is $2805 per military man, while the
others are: Latin America, $1701; North Africa, $1582; the Middle East, $1889; and Asia, $1304.
This disparity of at least 50% above the next highest region is remarkable for an area where man-
power probably comes as cheaply as anywhere else in the world.
IV. THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY.
Local Capabilities.
The high price which African states appear to be paying in order to provide an equipment
base for their armed forces is indicative of an important factor in the military programs of the
underdeveloped world. Because the emerging nations lack an industrial base, few of them are capa-
ble of sustaining their military equipment needs without resort to outside suppliers. Although
this means that the character of their military efforts will be very sensitive to the kinds of ar-
mament made available to them by such suppliers, some local capabilities do in fact exist and must
be taken into account. Differing levels of economic development mean that these local capabilities,
although generally small, can be of some significance.
Information on local arms industries is not readily available, but there are known to
exist numerous small arms and ammunition plants in countries such as Nigeria and even Afghanistan.
More advanced facilities including aircraft assembly and repair plants are available in India, Ar-
gentina and Egypt. The latter country has been developing its aeronautics capability with the
assistance of European technicians, with Nasser already in a position to make sales of military
aircraft to a few states: 2 locally produced rockets have been prominently displayed during parades
celebrating the revolution and the U.A.R. claims to have built a submarine with local capabili-
3ties. India's Hindustan Aircraft Industries is capable of assembling foreign airframes and of
American capabilities, on the other hand, are the concomitant of a mature economy.
5
Even among the developed countries it is an expensive and difficult procedure to attempt
a detailed local ordnance capability, The British aircraft industry is having trouble maintain-
ing momentum; while laboriously developed local aeronautics capabilities in Australia and Canada
are nearly moribund placing these countries in a partial client-state relationship with the United
States in filling their military aircraft needs. This does not neutralize the potential nuisance
of Nasser's air industry, but it does mean that even the widespread local small-arms factories are
of less significance in the armament situation in underdeveloped countries than the possibilities
of externally-procured weapons,
These local capabilities are roughly summarized in the tables in Appendix 1. The four
unit scale used for this purpose is qualitative rather than quantitative; t e,, it gives no esti
mate of the magnitude to which these capabilities could be developed only the degree of sophisti
cation Due to the lack of available information it is a very rough estimate and in need of much
refinement,
The Client State and the Obsolescence of Great Power Equipment,
If the underdeveloped countries must turn to external sources for most of their arms,
the question arises, of their ability to absorb and cope with the technology entailed, The
skills required to deal with many modern weapons systems are derived from industrial society, a
type of society which does not exist in most of these nations, The state of a country's economic
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models. When a threat becomes evident, any added resources made available tend to be used to per-
fect this model rather than to deal with the threat. 7
The demands upon technical'competence are closely related to the problem of availability.
The ordnance catalogues of both East and West are filled with sophisticated machinery of destruc-
tion. Some of this is available on a current basis, while some is available as it becomes obsolete
in the great power arms race. Such availability, however, is subject to a variety of factors and
can easily be over-rated. Although even smail ndmbers of modern weapons systems can represent
large increments of power to most countries in the world, few, if any, of these systems are sold
on the open market.
Some Soviet aid practices have led to great concern that the underdeveloped world
may eventually be flooded with weapons of considerable sophistication that nonetheless are
becoming obsolete in the arsenals of the super-powers. Indonesia has acquired Soviet light
and medium bombers and a cruiser with capabilities which only ten years ago very much piqued
the curiosity of the Royal Navy.* In some instances, even the most modern weapon systems
available were delivered to developingcountrievsec For-example, deliveries- of MiG-21 air-
craft tc India have occurred before all Soviet forces were re-equipped with this plane.
*The Indonesian cruiser "Irian" is believed to be the former Soviet "Ordzhonikidze,"
which brought Khruschev and Bulganin to the United Kingdom in 1954. The transverse propulsion
feature of this ship, which allowed it to "park" at dockside without any assistance was the
supposed item of interest behind the ill-fated night diving expedition of Commander Crabbe.
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Most of this material, however, is under the control of governments, and in the case of
the West its dissemination is likely to be based upon political considerations often focussed on
the stabilization of an area. Private concerns are not entirely at liberty to survey arms to all
PM comers, as embargoes on arms to South Africa illustrate. 9
The Arms Traffic.
The hardware diffusion problem thus relates to two aspec-ts of the arms traffic: govern-
ment aid and sales policies, and that of private or covert sources. Both are subject to a high
degree of control by governments, being almost inseparable in the case of most Western industrial
countries. Governments' licensing procedures and participation in the armaments industry (which
is often a government monopoly) give them an effective voice in determining who is given access to most
developments in weapons technology. Besides government monopolies, export licenses must be ob-
tained for most large shipments of arms. In the case of very large items, such as ships, govern-
ments have a monopoly on the supply of those available due to obsolescence, while new building is
subject to obvious constraints, including the economic factor of expense.
Underdeveloped countries typically receive most of their arms through aid programs nego-
tiated with principal supplier nations--the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Other powers capable of producing and supplying arms include
Belgium, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Israel, Canada and Australia. The abi-
lity of Communist China to be a major supplier is somewhat problematical, although China has been
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"barons", such as Col. Julian, "The Black Eagle-of Harlem," who turned up in Haiti1l while the Du-
valier regime was facing a period of instability.
In terms of security, these weapons are the tools of the insurgent. It has been sug-
gested, for example, that the Latin American insurgent is able to get a much better product for
his purpose by writing away to a Chicago mail order house than by relying upon covert shipments
of Soviet bloc weapons. Such clandestine supply lines require no export license and appear
to be able to slip through the customns arrangementseithet'openly or be devious means.12
In sum, then, the dissemination of most non-nuclear weapnns technology is largely
subject to factors affecting overall inter-governmental relations among nations, but at the lower
end of the arms scale the influx of weapons is highly sensitive to the effectiveness of a national
government's control over the routes of ingress. For both types of situations, however, the war
potential of developing countries is dependent upon client-state relationships. These relation-
ships are currently taking on the characteristics of a chain, with such aid-receiving states as
Algeria and Cuba becoming middle-men and themselves giving assistance to other countries. This
may increase the restraints on aid donors, representing as it does a loss of control over the
equipment turned over to these states. The aid given by both the United States and the Soviet
Union is affected in this respect by security considerations, while the United States has also
placed restrictions on the political usage of some of the equipmen't it gives away--i.e., to be
used against external aggression only--although the restriction may, in practice, be difficult
to enforce.
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can city would be very great, but American society would be able to continue with only minimum
effects. A selectively located nuclear explosion in Addis Ababa or Caracas, on the other hand,
could very effectively decapitate Ethiopian or Venezuelan society.
Very small nuclear development programs can therefore take on greater significance in
the underdeveloped world than in great power relations. Nevertheless, the "buy-in" price of even
a very limited program is estimated to be very high and the technology requires outside assistance
in the case of most developing countries.13 Through this necessity most countries are subjected
to the bi-lateral controls which generally attaeh-to ntcrlear ;reattor programs aided by 'the nuclear
powers. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) theoretically has certain regulatory powers
over material in its charge, but many of the underdeveloped countries have resisted undertaking
these obligations as long as the great powers were unwilling to subject themselves to similar con-
trols. As a consequence, bilateral arrangements are the common pattern, and the IAEA initially found
its major role to be one of serving ascdepository, for infarmation cn imuclear -energy.-14
Only two of the countries included in this study are regarded by a recent study
of the problem of diffusion as having significant nuclear potential: India and Israel. Both
are regarded as being in the process of creating the option of acquiring nuclear weapons on their
own by developing their nuclear establishments to the degree where this option can be exercised
at any time with a minimum of delay.15 More recently there have been reports of Egyptian efforts
to produce a nuclear contamination weapon.16 Otherwise most nuclear programs in the underdeveloped
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regarding a nuclear capability as feasible and worth their while have refused, while the option
to withdraw from the treaty is always open to signers for reasons of compelling national security.
Response to a Swedish proposal for a "non-atom club" elicited results of only fifty per.e:nt of
U.N. members in favor of this type of commitment.18
The generally very low nuclear potentialities of the developing countries have been
summarized in Appendix I on a four point scale. None of them is currently listed as having reached
the highest grade (3) of actually engaging in a weapons program, although persistent rumors would
put both Israel and Egypt in that category.
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Vietnam is eloquent testimony of the persistence of the problem. On the basis of our data, however,
it does not appear that any solid consensus on actual security requirements has yet emerged, al-
though more certain results may emerge from subsequent analysis. What does appear to be of
interest, however, is the tenacity with which these countries pursue certain fixed levels of
expenditure and armament once these have been determined upon. These levels vary greatly from
country to country, but the reasons for the selection of given levels seem worth pursuing in
further research. Among the younger nations of Africa, which are still apparently in the process
of selecting appropriate levels for themselves, the key question is whether they are likely to
act on the conviction of some observers that they ought to keep their force levels small, supple-
2
menting them with outside help when necessary.
Arms control represents one framework within which the armament and security problems
of these countries might be resolved. However, the wide range of security programs among the
developing countries suggests that a consensus on arms control measures may be harder to reach
than public pronouncements by their governments would indicate. It has been easy to be pro-
disarmament in negotiations emphasizing great power armaments. But serious attempts to apply
arms control measures to themselves will require a long period of discussion and thought to draw
together the disparate perceptions of security needs among the developing countries. Attempting
less than global approaches to the arms problem, such as dealing with arms control on a regional
basis, might enhance the prospects for reaching such consensus.
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interests of the great powers, and so some aspects of arms control in the developing areas must
be taken up by the larger powers. But where the super-powers once thought of limiting the area
of conflict, they now seek other means of competition in these areas, feeling that the nuclear
balance is currently fairly stable. Competition between East and West results in very different
views of the security needs of the new nations, and the importance of 'Wars of National Liberation"
in the Sino-Soviet rivalry is a complicating factor. Thus, limited approaches again seem most
promising.
All these difficulties notwithstanding, it remains possible that certain arms control
arrangements can be usefully applied to the developing areas. These measures should attempt to
use the arms control framework to bring three aspects of the military situation in these countries
into viable relationships. If current capabilities, security requirements, and the role of mili-
tary groups in these societies can be effectively integrated into an arms control approach, a real
contribution may be made to the difficult developmental process which the emerging nations are
undergoing.
The data collected for this study needs to be refined and extended, both by going
further back than the decade spanned by this research effort and by up-dating the material. The
data also need further rigorous analysis in order to check out some of the tentative findings
they suggest concerning security efforts and the inter-action between nations.
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INTRODUCTION
This appendix summarizes the most current available data on military capabilities in
eighty-four developing countries. The countries are listed alphabetically under five regional
groupings. Unless otherwise noted, the data is the most recent available for the 1962-1964
period, For material covering a number of consecutive years, see Appendix II,
General Notes
Armed Forces: Where a country is known to have naval or air force capabilities but no specifics
are available, the sign # appears in the appropriate column. Particularly in the case of new
African states,, this may imply that that branch is just being organized or exists only in a small
support capability. Where no information is available a blank space appears in the tables. An
"E" following a number indicates that it is the author's estimate. % Popwn indicates the percentage
of the population in the regular armed forces,,
Police. An estimate of police and other security forces than the military. Parentheses indicate
that a figure is partial, while a plus sign (+) means that the true number is slightly higher than
the one given, but not sufficiently to term the number partial.
Defense Budget: Current Def,, Bud.,(in M US $) = Estimate of current defense budget in millions of
US dollarso % of GNP = Percentage of GNP devoted to defense expenditure,
Munitions Manufacturing Capability: This column gives a rough estimate of the indigenous munitions
manufacturing capability in these countries, It is done on a four unit scale as follows:
0 = No capability
1 = Manufacture and repair of simple small arms and ammunition
2 = Manufacture of small arms and assembly and repair of lar-
ger weapons
3 = Assembly and/or manufacture of heavy weapons and/or air-
craft
1-3
from Leonard Beaton and John Maddox The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1962), pp. 185-200, The reactor data is largely as of 1960 LSee -source notes below_/
Major Defense Ties: Country has defense arrangements with the following organizations or
countries:
1. NATO
2. OAS (Organization of American States)
3. CENTO (Central Treaty Organization)
4. SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)
5. Union Africaine et Malgache




9. United Kingdom (and Commonwealth)
10. France (and Communaute6)
Sources: Sources for these data are largely the same as for Appendix II (see Appendix II,
pp. 6-8). In addition, material was used from:
Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1962),
Christoph Hohenemser, "The Nth Country Problem Today" in Seymour Melman (ed.)
Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics (Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962),





























































































































































Country Army Navy Force Forces % Pop'n Police
Burundi 800 None 800 0.03 850
Cameroun 2,700 # # 2,700 0.06 5,900
CAR 500 None 500 0.04 1,450
Chad 400 None 400 0.01 1,950
Congo (Bzvl) 700 700 0.08 500
Congo (Lpvl) 35,000 # # 35,000 0.23 15,000
Dahomey 800 # 800 0.03 1,700
Ethiopia 29,000 650 350 30,000 0.19 301000
Gabon 600 # # 600 0.13 900
Ghana 7,500 200E 300E 8,000 0.11 9,000
Guinea 5,000 # # 5,000 0.15 3,300
Ivory Coast 4,000 # 4,000 0311 2,280
Kenya 2,650 # 2,650 0,03 11,500
Liberia 3,580 80 # 3,660 0,27 700
Malagasy 2,600 # # 2600 0,04 5,900
Mali 3,100 # 3,100 0.07 1,250
Mauritania 500 # 500 0306 400
Niger 1,200 1,200 0.04 1,500
Nigeria 7,100 850 50 8,000 0.02 23,000
Rhodesia & Nyasaland 7,800 None 1,050 8,850 0.,09 15,000
Rwanda 900 None 900 0.03 650
Senegal 2,500 # # 2,500 0.08 4,000
Sierra Leone 1,850 # 1,850 0.07 2,000
Somalia 6,000 # # 6,000 0.27 4,800
South Africa 19,000 2,000 4,000 25,000 0.15 29,646
Sudan 11,000 # # 11,000 0.09 10,000
Tanganyika 1,350 # 1,350 0.01 5,000
Togo 1,000 # 1,000 0.06 280
Uganda 1,000 1,000 0.01 5,500
Upper Volta 1,000 1,000 0.02 1,335









These figures do not include the UN. Peace Force, which was 20,000 at its peak.
The per cent GNP figure is an estimate based on combined data from Rwanda and
Burundi (See Appendix II).
South Africa's 25,000-man regular force does not give a very accurate picture
of the military situation in that country, since there are numerous other forces
in several categories. There is also a 60,000 Citizen Force, roughly comparable
to the U. S. reserve forces, and another 60-80,000 "Kommandoes" which are a
mixture of reserves, a national guard and vigilantes. It is estimated that
145,000 men will be under varying degrees of arms by the end of 1964. (See the
New York Times, March 26, 1964).
The development of an air force is anticipated.
Rhodesia and Nyasaland:
Figures included in the table represent the situation prior to the break-up of the
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Country Army Nav Force Forces % Pop'n Police
Afghanistan 90,000 None # 90,000 0.64 21,000
Burma 60,000 3,000 9oo 63,900 0.27
Cambodia 28,800 1,200 # 30,000 0.50
Ceylon 5,300 1,980 1,600 8,880 0.08 9,267
China (Taiwan) 400,000 62,000 82,000 544,000 4.65
India 550,000 16,000 18,000 584,000 0.13 504 016
Indonesia 350,000 26,000 20,000 396,000 0.40
Japan 171,500 34,000 44,000 249,500 0.26
Korea (South) 570,000 42,000 15,000 627,000 2.31
Laos 80,000 4.15
Malaysia 6,900 1,000E 100E 8,000 0.11 28,500
Nepal 9,000 None 9,000 0.09
Pakistan 230,000 7,700 15,000 252,700 0.26
Philippines 20,000 4,000 6,000 30,000 0.10
Thailand 90,000 22,000 22,000 134,000 0.46
Vietnam (South) 201,000 10,000 5,000 216,000 1.42




Ceylon: Police figure is for 1960.
India: India's armed forces are currently undergoing expansion and re-equipment. A five-year
development plan anticipates the addition of six mountain divisions. (New York Times,
March 24, 1964).
Police figure is for 1960.
Japan: Japan is included in this study primarily because of its geographical position, filling
out the Asian periphery. It is not an underdeveloped country, although it has some
characteristics of a developing country.




Malaysia: Indonesian pressures on the new Federation are causing an increase in the armed forces,
with a conscription program anticipated. New York Times, February 27, 1964.
Police figure is for 1959 and for the Federation of Malaya only.
... . .... ...... . . ........... .. .. - ------ ------------ --  ------------ .. . .... .  . ..........
INTRODUCTION
The following tables provide a detailed set of statistical material and analysis on de-
fense data for eighty-four less-developed nations during the period from 1955-1965. The tables
are arranged alphabetically, and are preceded by summaries by region (Latin America, Sub-Saharan
Africa, North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia) of some of the averages derived in the analysis.
Each country table contains special footnotes to clarify the material in it, especially where some
estimates deviate markedly from those selected for inclusion in the table. Some general comments
on the reading and usage of the tables follow. More specific analysis will be found in the body
of the paper.
The annual (upper) portion of a country table is divided into two parts containing the
following categories: 1
POP(TH) = Population, in thousands of persons.
A. FORCES = Armed Forces (total), in thousands of servicemen.2
PERCENT = Armed Forces expressed as a percentage of the total population.
DX/AF Defense Expenditure per member of the Armed Forces, in U.S. dollars.
GNP(TH$) Gross National Product, in thousands of US. dollars.
1A schematic representation of the labelling scheme may be found before the first country
table (Afghanistan).
2Insofar as possible, these figures designate only the number of the true armed forces,
and not of any police or paramilitary groups. The distinctions between these two categories are
sometimes very fine, and separate figures are not always available, Data known to combine the
categories was excluded from the calculations and is footnoted by country.
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were made only where closeness of years or the consensus of other data made them seem reasonable,
and they are indicated by a preceding minus (-) sign. The same sign precedes other figures in the
annual portion of the table derived from such estimates. Interpolations were made only in the
case of Armed forces--not in Defense Budgets, and minus signs have this significance only in the
annual portion of the tables--not below among the averages,
A major purpose of this program was to give some picture of the thrust of developments
over time; however, some qualifications must be made concerning continuity. Several different
sources are generally involved in any series of data on a given country over the years covered by
the analysis,. This is because attributable figures have been used for any year for which such
figures could be found that did not seem unreasonable in view of other available data, (In case
of differing estimates, the most realistic figure was included in the program, and the other es-
timates are mentioned in the notes appearing at the bottom of the table, providing there was no
other reason for discarding the datum,) This consensus criterion of selection does not mean, how-
ever, that the methods and accuracy of different sources are precisely comparable. Fluctuations in
defense budget and armed forces figures over time myj therefore represent slight methodological
differences between sources rather than changes in a country's situation or policies, These effects
should be small and have little effect upon the overall analysis.
By taking the analysis over a constant period of eleven given years a problem arises in
dealing with major discontinuities in national policies, A sudden radical change in the level of
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that the forces or budget increased 10 % in any given year, although that may be a good approxima-
tion.
The caveat concerning small samples is especially applicable to this calculation. Where
there are few consecutive years of data to provide differences, one significant change in policy
can produce a disproportionate effect in this figure. For example, there are four years of data
on defense budgets in Paraguay, but only two of these are consecutive. The difference between
these two figures happens to represent over 50% of the average of the four budgets. Over the six
years between the first and last figures, however, the budget increased only a bit more than 100%.
Averaged over the six years, the difference between the first and last figures represents only
11,4% of the average budget. (This would be an alternative way to indicate changes in the eleven=-
or less- -year period, but it would be very sensitive to the characteristics of the first and last
years of data Whether they happened to be high years or low years, It would say nothing about
fluctuations between the first and last years, which may be very significant in terms of the
trend.) The number of differences (one less than the number of consecutive years' data) in-
volved is indicated in the regional summary tables (See below, page 9) and the reader is advised
to regard the increase/decrease index for any given country accordingly,
In any event, these indices are best treated as a comparative statistic rather than
attempting to attribute any absolute interpretation to them in the case of any one country. It is
thereby particularly noteworthy that the vast majority of these indices are positive numbers and,
in many cases, relatively large positive numbers, the implication being that defense efforts absorb
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Armed Forces Data:
Africa Report, January, 1964, pp. 4-21, (Entire issue on "The Armies of Africa")
Victor Alba, "The Stages of Militarism in Latin America," in J.J. Johnson (ed.),
The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1962).
Raymond VB. Blackman, (ed.), Jane's fighting Ships: 1962-63. (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1962).
Britannica Book of the Year--1958 (--1963). Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc,,
1958-1963).
Current Periodicals, especially, The New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, Africa
1963, and 1964, etc,
Manfred Halpern, 'Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class" in JJ. Johnson, o.P
cit. (These figures tend to seem high and were generally excluded from the final calculations.)
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliance. The
Military Balance, 1962-1963, and The Military Balance: 1963-1964. (London: I.S.S., 1962 and
1963).
International Affairs (Moscow), "Readers' Questions Answered: The Armed Forces of the
Latin American Countries," January 1964 (No. 1), pp. 103-105.
Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964). (These figures deviated widely -- both high and low--from
other figures in many cases and were seldom included in the final calculations,)
Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America. (New York: Harper and Row for the
Council on Foreign Relations, 1959).
SH. Steinberg (ed.), The Statesman's Yearbook 1962-63 (and others). (New York: St,
Martin's Press, 1962 and others).
U.S Senatei Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcomittee on Disarmament, Controland re
duction of Armaments. Final Report and Annexe3, Aug1ust, 1958.
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Regional Summaries of Data
The following pages summarize the averages of data contained in this Appendix. They are
alphabetically listed by country, the countries being divided into five geographical regions. The
first two pages for each region summarize the numerical data, while the third page gives rank orders
for each category.
In the numerical tables, the figure in the column headed '"Yrs. Data" indicates the number
of years of data included in those averages to its left as far as the preceding "Yrs. Data" column.
In the case of African countries, a "Yrs, Data" figure in parentheses indicates that, although the
average figures were computed on the basis of that number of years of data, a preceding figure of
zero ("0") was a meaningful point of departure. That is, that no armed forces existed at that
time, the intermediate figures generally having been interpolated between that zero and a fixed
figure for some later year. Comparable to the "Yrs. Data" column is the "Number of Differences"
given in the case of the Average Increase of the Defense Budget or Armed Forces (see pages 4-6 of
this appendix). Figures derived from small data samples as indicated by these columns should be
regarded with reservations. Where it is meaningful a regional average is included at the bottom
of the table, while "ND" in any column indicates No Data available.
In the rank order tables the countries of each region are ranked from highest to lowest
in each category. Where no data exists, the countries are listed as "Not Ranked." Brackets















































































































































































































































































































































Avg. Yrs. Avg. Inc. Number of Avg. Inc. Number of
Country DX/AF Data A.F. Differences D.B. Differences
Cameroun $8078 4 21.55% 3 16.29% 3
C.A.R. 4829 1 49.01 2 198.06 1
Chad 5769 1 51.27 2 -- -
Congo (Bxvl) 6491 1 47.00 2 5.39 1
Congo 333 1 7.62 4 -- -
Dahomey 1110 1 17.78 3 ---
Ethiopia 757 2 -3.30 6 -- -
Gabon 3958 2 29.63 3 50.00 1
Ghana 4521 6 24.00 5 22.43 7
Guinea 1427 1 16.36 5 -- -
Ivory Coast 2719 1 24,06 3 -
Kenya 214 1 3.55 2 -13.90 5
Liberia 471 2 1.00 5
Malagasy 2115 2 44.44 2 11.81
Mali 2900 1 3,28 1 --
Mauritania 4097 2 49.01 2 193.51 1
Niger 2176 3 33.33 2 53,68 2
Nigeria 3295 2 7.67 3 39-54 1
Rhod. & Nyas. 2926 1 .8.85 1 12.79 8
Rwanda/Burundi ND - 12.71 2 --
Senegal 3600 1 40.91 2 10.53 1
Sierra Leone 1189 1 55.48 2 -- -
Somalia 870 2 20.55 2 6z18 2
South Africa 6680 1 -- - 20.97 10
Sudan 1446 8 3.69 7 15.22 8
Tanganyika 875 1 12,98 3 8.05 5
Togo 2316 1 57.69 2 60.81 1
Uganda 579 2 17.21 2 -5.02 7
Upper Volta 2800 1 -- -
Zanzibar & Pemba ND - ND ND ND ND
Regional Averages $2805
11-17






















































































































































* The following figures are in accordance with the second set of data for Turkey
in relevant calculations: (see notes on country table for Turkey):
and are not included
1.600% 6 $ 648.5mTurkey 449,500 4.47% $ 23.58 9
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Avg. A. F. Avg. D. B.































































Yemen Yemen Yemen Cyprus
Kuwait
Yemen
* Turkey: By using alternative available data (See note in Appendix II, Turkey.), the rank of Turkey
would be changed as follows (with corresponding changes for other countries between the old and the new
















































































































































































































































lIncluded for comparative purposes only.








































































































































































































































































































AVG. A.F. AS PCT. OF POP=
AVG. INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
AVG. DEF. BUD.=
AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT OF GNP=

































































































































































A.F. AS PCT. OF POP=
INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
DEF. BUD.=
DEF.BUD. AS PCT OF GNP=

































































































































































































A.F. AS PCT. OF POP=
INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
DEF , BUD.=
DEF.BUD. AS PCT OF GNP=



















Notes: Wolf uses figures of $112 million and $113 million for the 1958 and 1959 defense
budgets respectively; but these may include foreign aid. His resultant percentages are
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INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
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AVG. INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
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Notes: International Affairs (Moscow) gives a 1963 defense figure of $52 million.
Altbough this was the source used for the 1963 armed forces level, the budget figure















































































































































A.F. AS PCT. OF POP=
INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
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DEF.BUD. AS PCT OF GNP=
INCREASE OF D.B. AS PCT
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AVG. A.7. AS PCT. OF POP=
AVG. IACI EASE OF A.F. AS PCT
AVG. DEF. BUD.=
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Notes. The 200 man decrease in the armed forces between 1963 and 1964 may be due













































































































































A.F. AS PCT. 0F POP=
INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
DEF. BUD.=
DEF.BUD. AS PCT OF GNP=




























































































































































A.F. AS PCT. ,F POP=
INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
DEF. BUD.=
DEF.BUD. AS PCT OF GNP=



























































































































































A.F. AS PCT. OF POP=
INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
DEF. BUD.=
DEF.BUD. AS PCT OF GNP=

















Notes: It has been reported that Ghana is expanding its armed forces toward a figure
of 13,000, but no time schedule is available In 1965, this would represent 0,174% of
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INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
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Notes. 3700 is te ceiling on armed forces allocated to Honduras by the 1923
Convention on Arms limitation in Central America. Bow accurate it is in describing























































































1956 and 1957 are from Modelski, p. 249;
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AVG. INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
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Notes Halpern gives a figure of $440 million defense expenditure in 1957
(21,2% GNP.) which may include extensive outside aid. The Institute for Strategic
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INCREASE OF A.F. AS PCT
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Notes: Estimates of the Israeli defense budget vary widely, the public budget figures
(U.N. Statistical Yearbook) being between one-half and one-third of those used here,
which have been provided by the Harvard Center for Middle East Affairs. Estimates range
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Notes: Kenya's army was recently reported to cost about
York Times, March 21, 1964), but the basis for this figure









$7 million per annum (New
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Notes: Population and GNP figures are based on Federation of Malaya alone
Russett"'s figure of 2.70% GNP for the 1959 defense budget would be the
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Notes Alba and Lieuwen give figures of
or about 0,9% of the population.
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Notest A new census in March 1964 sets
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Notes Peru has recently announced
10,4 million, (New York Times, April 1














































































































































































The 1964 armed forces figure represents the total armed forces after the
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Notes: Somalia is reported to be seeking to build a 20,000 man army with the help of
Soviet aid., This would be the fourth largest army in Sub-Saharan Africa and would
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Notes: The drop in armed f
involved in riots in January,
No. 3, February 7, 1964),
orces between 1963 and 1964 was due to discharge of men
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Nors: Scholars at the Harvard Cenrter for Middle East Studies have criticized the stat=
istics given for Turkey on the preceding page on the grounds that currency conversion is
not realistic and the calculations should be carried out entirely in the local currency,
5ince this would minimize the comparative value of the study if done for all countries, it
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Notes: International Affairs (Moscow)




























































































































































































































. This appendix consists of tables for each of eighty-four underdeveloped countries' showing
their projected populations and Gross National Products from 1961 to 1975. Accompanying these fi-
gures in each table are seven columns of figures representing varying modal percentages of these in-
dices which are commonly devoted by nations to their defense efforts in accordance with their per-
* ception of threats to national security. Round percentage figures have been chosen to bracket the
-. range of typical national behavior emerging from the data contained in Appendix II, although high
extremes have been omitted,
By making certain assumptions about the behavior of a country to place it on the scale of
modes, one may read off an estimate of the manpower and economic resources which that country might
be devoting to its defense effort over the next dozen years. This is, needless to say, a hazardous
procedure, but there are some guidelines that may be used to give meaning to the tables.
These guidelines may be derived from previous national behavior and historical examples.
Any historical case is necessarily bound up with a wide range of particulars associated with the
given situation. What does emerge from the data in Appendix IT, however, is that multi-variant
analysis of each case is not necessary in situations which cover the majority of cases, Most coun-
-. tries show considerable stability in their defense behavior over time, at least as shown in the
variables we have selected. Nations seem to become oriented toward either a numerical figure or a
1Countries in the Appendix are the same as those found on page 23 of Appendix II; but omitting the
" foir developed countries.
111-3
Although there are seven modes in each table, one should not attempt to relate these on
a one-to-one basis from the armed forces extrapolations to the budgetary tables. While it is like-
ly that a shift in modes along one set of indices will produce a shift in the same direction on the
other, the exact correlation will be determined by a complicated variety of factors. Among these
will be the relative emphasis put on manpower as opposed to equipment, pay scales (a raise in mili-
tary pay would change the budgetary picture while not necessarily changing the manpower index),
availability of foreign aid and equipment, and so forth, India, for example, has spent an average
of 2,2% of its GNP on defense in recent years, nearest to the fifth mode, but its mobilized man-
power has run about 0.1% of population, the seventh mode.
It may be useful to remind the reader of some actual cases that can be associated with
each of these modal percentages as an additional guide in using this appendix.
(See following two pages)
111-5
Defense Expenditure as % GNP
Mode Percent Examples
1 20% U.,S. in World War II (nearly twice this: 41% in
1943, 1944)
Soviet Union (unofficial estimates)
II 15% United Kingdom in 1939
U.S. in 1953 (Korean War and rearmament)
III 10% U.S. in recent years
Soviet Union (Official estimates)
/Average Middle Eastern state: 7.45%/

















VII 0,5% Costa Rica










































































































































































Notes: Armed Forces data is rising, but should stabilize between 0.5 and 1



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Armed Forces are increasing (See App. II and text).,













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes, Armed Forces are increasing (See App. II and text).




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes:. Armed Forces were numerical
a drop to 7900 in 1962.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: India's conflict with China is causing an increase





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS$US)
15.0 10.0 5.00
550. 259700.( 129850.





000. 348000. 1 4000.
100. 365400. 182700.
400. 383600. 191800.
200. 402800. 201400. 1
500. 423000. 211500. 1
150. 444100. 222050. 1
450. 466300. 233150. 1
400. 489600. 244800. 1

















There is a numerical stability of 60,000 to 70,000 men for the reglar Israeli





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Armed Forces situation is too unstable for extropolationo









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Armed Forces are increasing (See App. II and text).
















































































































































































































































Armed Forces are increasing (See App. II and text).















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































174 7 50. 116500.
Forces level is unstable current- ,y
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